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"THE COST OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP": THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE (REASONABLE)
PRICE OF FEDERALISM
Aaron j Rogers*
The powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the Federal
Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.... The pow-
ers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties
and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.
-James Madison1
In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the
government of the Union, and those of the states. They are each
sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither
sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other.
-Chief Justice John Marshall
2
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires, inter alia, that "[ijn all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."3 This right has long been considered "indispensable to the
fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice"4 and,
since its enshrinement in modern form in Massiah v. United States,5 has
protected criminal defendants from government interrogation
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.S., Business
Administration, University of Texas at Dallas, 2004.
1 THE FEDERALiST No. 45, at 108 (James Madison) (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2003).
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
5 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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outside of counsel's presence after the institution of adversarial pro-
ceedings. 6 The right to counsel, however, is not unbounded; among
its important limitations is its "offense specific" nature.7 In Texas v.
Cobb,8 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of this offense-speci-
ficity constraint, holding that the proper test for attachment of the
right to counsel is the same test articulated in Blockburger v. United
States9 for purposes of double jeopardy.10 Despite a vigorous dissent,
the Court found that there was "no constitutional difference between
the meaning of the term 'offense' in the contexts of double jeopardy
and of the right to counsel."" After Cobb, a defendant charged with
one crime is not constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel
regarding investigations for another crime requiring proof of an addi-
tional fact.
The adoption of Blockburger in the right to counsel context has
raised an important question for the lower courts interpreting Cobb:
did Cobb adopt Blockburger wholesale and with it the dual sovereignty
6 Id. at 205-06; see also 2 JOsHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.02, at 43 (4th ed. 2006) ("The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies only after the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings; the
Court has concluded that this commencement starts the 'criminal prosecution' for
right-to-counsel purposes."). In this context, the word "interrogation" is used
loosely-as the Court has found Sixth Amendment violations in cases involving infor-
mal conversations with government informants, see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
163-65 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1980); Massiah, 377
U.S. at 203, and responses to a policeman's appeal to a defendant's conscience, see
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392-93-on the grounds that these statements were "deliberately
elicited" from the accused in contravention of his right to counsel. Massiah, 377 U.S.
at 206; cf Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation, and the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 67
(1966) (calling the question of when and under what conditions interrogation may
take place "[p] erhaps the most difficult and controverted question in American crimi-
nal procedure").
7 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
8 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
9 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
10 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173. The Blockburger test states that, where one must deter-
mine whether multiple offenses are at issue, the determinative question is "whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 336, 342 (1911)).
11 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173. Justice Breyer's dissent countered that importation of
the Blockburger test would permit law enforcement officers to circumvent the right to
counsel by "'spinn [ing] out a... series of offenses from a single ... criminal transac-
tion.'" Id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445
n.10 (1970)). Furthermore, Justice Breyer felt that the new rule would "threaten[ ]
the legal clarity necessary for effective law enforcement" by adopting a test which is
complex in application. Id. at 184-85.
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doctrine which has informed its application?' 2 That is, may the offi-
cials of one sovereign permissibly question a suspect outside of coun-
sel's presence regarding a crime for which she has already been
charged by another sovereign, even though the two sovereigns' crimes
would otherwise be the same offense under Blockburger? This question
has been nettlesome, with important values implicated on both sides.
On one hand is a defendant's interest in having the full complement
of counsel's assistance as granted by the Constitution; on the other is
the sovereign's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of its peo-
ple. On this point the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not in agreement; in
fact, they are nearly evenly split on the issue. The Second and Eighth
Circuits have rejected the idea that Cobb adopted the dual sovereignty
doctrine in the Sixth Amendment context as being too susceptible of
collusive manipulation, 13 and the Seventh Circuit has indicated a simi-
lar inclination on its part in dicta. 14 However, the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion, 15 finding that in
Cobb "the Court effectively foreclosed any argument that the dual sov-
ereignty doctrine does not inform the definition of 'offense' under
the Sixth Amendment."
16
In this Note, I argue that the latter approach is, properly under-
stood, the correct one, comporting with the plain language of the
Court's decision in Cobb, the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment, and the federalism values embodied in the dual sovereignty
doctrine. In Part I, I shall analyze the development of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, its dramatic expansion and recent con-
traction, and the values underlying that development. In Part II, I
shall discuss the growth of the dual sovereignty doctrine as a federal-
ism concern in the double jeopardy context. Finally, in Part III, I shall
12 The dual sovereignty doctrine recognizes that a criminal offense is an offense
against the government, and thus when a single act violates the criminal laws of two
different sovereigns, the actor has committed two discrete offenses. See Heath v. Ala-
bama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); see also Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The
Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CrmM.
L. 1, 3 (1992) ("The rationale is that an individual can, in a single act, violate the laws
of each sovereign; and each government, as a sovereign, retains the power to try and
punish that individual for the breach of the order that it protects.").
13 See United States v. Mills, 412 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2002).
14 See United States v. Krueger, 415 F.3d 766, 777 (7th Cir. 2005).
15 See United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 81 (2006); United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2005); United
States v. Avants, 278 F.3d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 2002).
16 Avants, 278 F.3d at 517.
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explain why the dual sovereignty doctrine is appropriately applied to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Pre-Massiah History
The right to counsel as it exists today cuts a much broader swath
than it did early in our republic's history. In fact, its pedigree in early
Anglo-American criminal law can scarcely be called venerable.1 7 In
medieval Britain, the right to counsel was restricted solely to pleading
matters of law at trial, at least for felons.18 Gradually these restrictions
were loosened, with access to counsel first being permitted for those
charged with treason, and finally to all felony defendants in 1836.19
In the colonies, this harsh approach was never followed. Most of the
states had statutory or constitutional provisions providing for some
form of the right to counsel prior to ratification of the Constitution.20
However, the right was not considered to be one of the more impor-
17 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1973) (observing the severe
limitations on the British common law right to counsel); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (noting the right's lack of firm historical fixation, despite its
significance), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE MASSIAH LINE OF CASES (1986)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT] ("The right to counsel as it now exists had
no counterpart at common law."), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 661, 672
(1989); James .1. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against
Informants: Truth, FairPlay, and theMassiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 10 (1988)
("The right to counsel does not have the illustrious Anglo-American heritage one
might expect."). For a detailed history of the right to counsel in England and colo-
nial America, see generally Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018-34 (1964) [hereinafter Historical
Argument] (examining the development of the English and early American rights to
counsel).
18 See, e.g., ArrORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 672. Ironically, misde-
meanor and civil defendants were permitted greater freedom of access to counsel,
despite the lesser severity of the charges against them. Felons were viewed by the
Crown as especially dangerous, yielding this seemingly incongruous system of
defense. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 306-07 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60
(1932)); ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 672.
19 See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 672-73; Historical Argument,
supra note 17, at 1027-28. The abolition of the distinction between questions of law
and questions of fact finally afforded this right to felons; however, there is some indi-
cation that felons were accorded the right as early as the mid-eighteenth century. See
id.
20 See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 61-65 (surveying colonial right to counsel
provisions).
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tant inclusions in the Bill of Rights largely because, as understood at
the time, it referred solely to assistance at trial by an attorney retained
by the defendant.21 Thus, the right lay relatively dormant until the
twentieth century.
The Supreme Court first indicated that the right to counsel
might have increased bite in Powell v. Alabama.22 In holding that the
defendants were entitled to assistance of counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 23 the Court noted in dicta that "during per-
haps the most critical period of the proceedings .... from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consulta-
tion, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally impor-
tant, the defendants ... were as much entitled to [the assistance of
counsel] during that period as at the trial itself."24 Powell emphasized,
for the first time, a constitutional right to assistance of counsel at pre-
trial stages and set the stage for the Court's later more sweeping
proposals. 2
5
The Court revisited the right-to-counsel issue in Spano v. New
York.26 In Spano, the defendant had been involved in a shooting after
an altercation at a bar.27 Following indictment, the defendant
retained counsel and turned himself in to the police. 28 After repeat-
edly requesting his attorney's presence during the subsequent interro-
gation, and repeatedly having these requests denied, the defendant
confessed to the shooting.29 As in Powell, the Court, per Chief Justice
Warren, rested its reversal of the defendant's murder conviction on
the denial of due process.30 However, Justice Douglas, joined by jus-
tices Black and Brennan, went further in concurrence. Relying on
Powell, Justice Douglas stated that "[d]epriving a person, formally
charged with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may
21 See Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 10-11.
22 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23 Specifically, the Court held that due process required the appointment of
counsel in capital cases, regardless of whether the defendant requested counsel,
where the defendant could not employ counsel and was unable to defend himself due
to "ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like." Id. at 71.
24 Id. at 57.
25 See Martin Bahl, Comment, The Sixth Amendment as Constitutional Theory: Does
Originalism Require That Massiah Be Abandoned?, 82J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 423, 427
(1991).
26 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
27 Id. at 316.
28 Id. at 316-17.
29 Id. at 317-19.
30 Id. at 320 ("[W]e find use of the confession obtained here inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment under traditional principles.").
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be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself,"31
since this phase may be the only one at which counsel's legal acumen
is of use to the accused.3 2 Justice Stewart, concurring separately with
Justices Douglas and Brennan, also believed that the right to counsel
had been violated by the government's conduct.3 3 These strong
words, coupled with the application of the Sixth Amendment to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 set the stage for the Court's
creation of the modern right to counsel.
B. Massiah and the Expansion of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Following the concurrences in Spano to their logical extremity,
the Supreme Court announced a dramatic expansion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in Massiah.35 In Massidh, the defendant,
a merchant seaman, was arrested and indicted for possession of
cocaine aboard a United States ship; another man, Colson, was simi-
larly charged. 36 Following their release on bail, and without Massiah's
knowledge, Colson agreed to assist the government in its investigation
through installation of a radio transmitter in his vehicle.3 7 Thereafter,
while the two conversed in Colson's automobile, Massiah made a
number of incriminating statements to Colson, which were subse-
quently used against Massiah at his trial.38
The Supreme Court, relying principally on the concurring opin-
ions of Justices Douglas and Stewart in Spano and the Court's decision
in Powell, found Massiah's Sixth Amendment rights had been vio-
31 Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 326 ("When [a defendant] is deprived of th[e] right [to counsel] after
indictment and before trial, he may indeed be denied effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.").
33 Id. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Surely a Constitution which promises [the
right to counsel during trial] can vouchsafe no less to the same man under midnight
inquisition in the squad room of a police station.").
34 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding that the right
to counsel is a "fundamental right" under the Fourteenth Amendment).
35 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Massiah decision has been
called "a giant step in a wholly new direction" by "an intrepid majority," but has none-
theless proven "strangely durable." H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the
Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM.
L. REX'. 1137, 1155-56 (1987); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Massiah certainly is the decision in which Sixth Amend-
ment protections have been extended to their outermost point.").
36 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202.
37 Id. at 202-03.
38 Id. at 203.
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lated.39 The Court gave little constitutional support for its decision,
instead asserting that "the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of
criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with
crime" dictated the outcome. 40 Thus, the Court held, where "federal
agents had deliberately elicited [incriminating statements] from [the
defendant] after he had been indicted and in the absence of his coun-
sel," the defendant had been denied the "basic protections" of the
Sixth Amendment.41 Justice Stewart's majority found it inconsequen-
tial that Massiah's statements had been elicited while he was free on
bail, believing that "indirect and surreptitious interrogations" must be
covered to make the right to counsel truly effective. 42 Justice White,
joined by justices Clark and Harlan, criticized the majority's reasoning
in dissent, stating that "the right to counsel ha[d] never meant as
much before." 43 There was no reason, in Justice White's estimation,
to assume that statements made outside of an attorney's presence
were involuntary, and voluntariness had been the Court's prior touch-
stone for admissibility.44 The Court's new rule, Justice White believed,
39 Id. at 204-05.
40 Id. at 205 (citing People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)). This
lack of constitutionally based reasoning has been one of the most frequent criticisms
of Massiah. See, e.g., Henry, 447 U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The doctrinal
underpinnings of Massiah have been largely left unexplained .... "); ATroRNEY GEN-
ERAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 684-90 (criticizing the Massiah rule as having "no
support in history, logic, or considerations of sound policy"); Martin R. Gardner, The
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy
Protection, 90J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 401 (2000) ("The Massiah Court offered
little explanation for the basis of its holding."); Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 8 ("The
Court's explorations of the Massiah right have failed tojustify adequately the constitu-
tional recognition of a counsel safeguard against informants' attempts to secure
incriminating admissions."). Instead, the theme of trial fairness, protected by ensur-
ing that the defendant has not already been convicted through the State's pretrial
conduct, has been the predominant underlying value. See Gardner, supra, at 403; see
also Arro'mv GENERAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 683 (discussing the role of ensuring
a fair trial and the integrity of the truth-finding process as the primary goals in the
Court's post-Massiah Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
41 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 209 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that there had been no
hindrance of trial preparation or consultation between the defendant and his attor-
ney, and that it was "only a sterile syllogism ... to say that because Massiah had a right
to counsel's aid before and during the trial, his out-of-court conversations and admis-
sions must be excluded if obtained without counsel's consent or presence." Id.
44 Id. at 210 (citing Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958)).
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would hamper law enforcement and provide unprecedented and
unwarranted protection against betrayal by partners in crime. 45
Following Massiah, the Court did not revisit the right to counsel
until Brewer v. Williams,46 where it further enlarged that right. In
Brewer, the defendant had been arrested and arraigned for the abduc-
tion of a missing girl and was being transported from Davenport,
Iowa, to Des Moines. 47 Although the defendant had told the accom-
panying detectives that he would tell them what had happened after
consulting with his attorney in Des Moines, one of the detectives,
knowing the defendant to be a religious man, remarked on the right
of the girl's parents to give their child a Christian burial.48 The detec-
tive did not ask the defendant for a response, and instead told the
defendant not to answer him, but to think about what he had said.
49
Later during his transport, the defendant led the detectives to the
girl's body.50
The Supreme Court, finding a violation the defendant's rights,
stated that
the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer
at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment."51
According to Justice Stewart, again writing for the Court, Massiah
made clear that the commencement of adversary proceedings against
a defendant gave him the constitutional right to legal representation
during government interrogation; the case was "constitutionally indis-
tinguishable" from Massiah, notwithstanding the fact that Williams'
statements had not been surreptitiously elicited. 52 The Court further
held that the defendant had not waived his Sixth Amendment right.
Waiver, said the Court, requires proof of "'an intentional relinquish-
45 Id. at 211-12.
46 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The Court did decide Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), as a Sixth Amendment case shortly after Massiah. However, the Court later
read its opinion in Escobedo to be-like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)-an
implementation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, rather
than a vindication of the right to counsel. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972).
47 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390-91.
48 Id. at 392-93.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
52 Id. at 400-01.
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ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' ,53 and, because
the defendant had expressly asserted his right to counsel and the
detectives thereafter elicited incriminating statements without making
any attempt to determine whether he desired to relinquish that right,
waiver was absent.54 The public's interest in law enforcement, though
important, did not outweigh the defendant's interest in assistance of
counsel.
55
The majority's opinion was not lightly received by the dissenters,
particularly Chief Justice Burger, who called it "intolerable. '56 The
dissenters found Massiah to be eminently distinguishable because of
the lack of covert elicitation of Williams' statements. 57 The Chief Jus-
tice noted that the defendant had been informed of his constitutional
rights, that he understood them, and that he voluntarily waived those
rights.58 To find otherwise simply because of the absence of the
defendant's attorney "denigrates an individual to a nonperson whose
free will has become hostage to a lawyer" and deprives the suspect of
his right to decide whether to make disclosures without his lawyer's
consent.59 Furthermore, found the Chief Justice, "the fundamental
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to safeguard the fairness of the
trial and the integrity of the factfinding process. '60 Because the
defendant's disclosures were "voluntary and uncoerced," these values
were not served by the statements' exclusion.61 Similarly, Justice
White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, voiced objection
to the idea that the Massiah right to counsel was "a right not to be
asked any questions in counsel's absence rather than a right not to
answer any questions in counsel's absence," especially where such
"wafer-thin distinctions" permitted an admittedly guilty murderer to
53 Id. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 406 ("'[D]isinterested zeal for the public good does not assure either
wisdom or right in the methods it pursues."' (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
605 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
56 Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 426 n.8; see also id. at 440 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (noting that the
surreptitious nature of the interrogation in Massiah was not "constitutionally irrele-
vant" to that decision).
58 Id. at 417-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 419.
60 Id. at 426.
61 Id.; see also id. at 437 (White, J., dissenting) (insisting that the action of the
detectives "did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of [the defendant]'s
trial or in any way risk the conviction of an innocent man-the risk against which the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel is designed to protect").
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go free.62 Finally, Justice Blackmun's dissent, in which Justices White
and Rehnquist joined, asserted that the majority's interpretation of
Massiah was "far too broad," making any attempt to elicit information,
even where there was no deliberate deprivation of counsel's assis-
tance, to be "tantamount to interrogation." 63
Massiah continued to metastasize in United States v. Henry,6 4 where
the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, found that use of state-
ments obtained by a paid informant placed in the defendant's cellb-
lock violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
despite the fact that the informant had not "question [ed]" or "initi-
ate [d] any conversations with" the defendant.65 Although the Court
recognized that use of undercover informants did not violate either
the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, 66 the Sixth Amendment had been
violated because the information was "deliberately elicited" from the
defendant.67 The defendant did not know that his cellmate was work-
ing for the government, thus obviating the possibility of waiver; fur-
ther, the Court believed the defendant's confinement could make
him even more vulnerable to the informant's ploys. 68 "By intention-
ally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating
statements without the assistance of counsel," the government violated
the Sixth Amendment.
69
62 Id. at 436; see also Uviller, supra note 35, at 1162 (noting that Brewer's "unmis-
takable thrust" is that "interrogation or its equivalent is precluded after accusation").
63 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 439-40 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). "When there is no inter-
rogation, such statements should be admissible as long as they are truly voluntary."
Id. at 440.
64 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
65 Id. at 268. Not all commentators view Henry as an expansion of Massiah. See
Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 17 & n.69 (interpreting Henry to require a basis for
attributing the informant's actions to the government, in addition to the "deliberate
elicitation" requirement). However, most agree that Henry extended Massiah beyond
its previous bounds. See Bahl, supra note 25, at 434; Kevin T. Kerr, Note, United
States v. Henry: The Further Expansion of the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel During
Interrogations, 8 PEPP. L. REv. 451, 451 (1981).
66 Henry, 447 U.S. at 272 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
67 Id. The Court later noted in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), that
"deliberate elicitation" requires more than pure passivity on the part of the listener.
Id. at 459 ("[T]he defendant must demonstrate ... some action, beyond merely lis-
tening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.").
68 Henry, 447 U.S. at 272-74.
69 Id. at 274; cf. id. at 276 (Powell,J., concurring) ("The rule of Massiah serves the
salutary purpose of preventing police interference with the relationship between a
suspect and his counsel once formal proceedings have been initiated.").
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, argued in dissent that
the Court had "cut[ I] loose from the moorings of Massiah" by finding
the elicitation to be "deliberate," which Justice Blackmun equated
with intentional extraction of information, and expanding that
requirement by adopting a "likely to induce" test that resulted in a
violation even where, as here, the informant had not stimulated the
divulgence. 70 Justice Rehnquist went further, encouraging the recon-
sideration of Massiah itself.71 Justice Rehnquist looked to Powell for
the notion that the Sixth Amendment was properly interpreted as
requiring assistance in the preparation of the defendant's case at trial
in order to assure its fairness.7 2 Because the right to counsel extended
to "critical stages" of the proceedings, the key issue for Justice Rehn-
quist was the lawyer's traditional role as "legal expert and strategist," a
role ignored in Massiah as well as in Henry, where meetings with the
defendants' attorneys were not obstructed or interrupted and trial
preparation was not impeded. 73 To Justice Rehnquist, the entire Mas-
siah view of the right to counsel was divorced from the proper under-
standing of "counsel" and its role in the proceedings, a role which did
not encompass presence at every interrogation simply because pro-
ceedings had been instituted.74
The Court's adherence to an expansive view of Massiah persisted
in Maine v. Moulton,7 5 where the Sixth Amendment was deemed to
give the accused "the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between
70 Id. at 277, 280 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 289 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 291; see also id. at 292-93 ("[T] he concerns underlying the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel are to provide aid to the layman in arguing the law and in
coping with intricate legal procedure, and to minimize the imbalance in the adversary
system that otherwise resulted with the creation of the professional prosecuting offi-
cial." (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307-09 (1973))).
73 Id. at 293. Justice Rehnquist further stated:
If the event is not one that requires knowledge of legal procedure, involves a
communication between the accused and his attorney concerning investiga-
tion of the case or the preparation of a defense, or otherwise interferes with
the attorney-client relationship, there is in my view simply no constitutional
prohibition against the use of incriminating information voluntarily
obtained from an accused despite the fact that his counsel may not be
present.
Id. at 293-94. In such circumstances, the defendant's Miranda warnings were ade-
quate to inform him of his rights. Id. at 294.
74 Id. at 291-94.
75 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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him and the State" once formal proceedings have commenced. 76
Although the facts were strikingly similar to Massiah,77 the informant
in Moulton had been hired to investigate a crime separate from the
one with which the defendant had been charged. 78 While admitting
the government's interest in investigating crimes for which formal
charges have been brought as well as additional crimes, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion held that evidence regarding the pending charges must
be excluded lest the Court "invite [ ] abuse by law enforcement per-
sonnel in the form of fabricated investigations" which could "evis-
cerat[e] . .. the Sixth Amendment.
'79
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, and (in relevant part) O'Connor,80 called the majority's deci-
sion a 'judicial aberration conferring a windfall benefit to those who
are the subject of criminal investigations for one set of crimes while
already under indictment for another."' In his view, the Sixth
Amendment, even as broadly interpreted in Massiah, was not violated
by the use of incriminating statements obtained by investigators in
good faith while investigating another crime; violation of the Sixth
Amendment focused on whether the government "deliberately cir-
cumvented counsel" with respect to the indictment.8 2 Where the
statements were gathered for a legitimate reason separate from the
charged offenses, there was no such deliberate circumvention.8 3 Mas-
siah was not intended to inoculate charged defendants against investi-
gation of their involvement in uncharged offenses.8 4 As for the
majority's concern about official misconduct, this was, in ChiefJustice
Burger's opinion, better dealt with by excluding evidence in those
76 Id. at 176. "The Sixth Amendment protects the right of the accused not to be
confronted by an agent of the State regarding matters as to which the right to counsel
has attached without counsel being present." Id. at 178 n.14.
77 Indeed, in a strange case of d~j;t vu, the informant in Moulton, like the one in
Massiah, was named Colson. Id. at 162.
78 Id. at 162-66.
79 Id. at 180.
80 Justice O'Connor did not concur in Chief Justice Burger's criticism of the
majority's extension of the exclusionary rule to cover the case. Id. at 181, 190-92
(Burger, CJ., dissenting). This "exceptionally controversial" rule, see 1 DRESSLER &
MICHAELS, supra note 6, § 20.01, at 365, has been most often applied by the Court in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment areas, and its place in Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence is not entirely clear. See id. § 25.07, at 550-55;JamesJ. Tomkovicz, The Massiah
Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REv. 751,
752 (1989).
81 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 187-88.
83 Id. at 185-87.
84 Id. at 190.
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cases where it could be shown that the officers acted in bad faith or
charged separate offenses as a pretext to elude Massiah.
85
The Court's final expansive treatment of the Sixth Amendment
and Massiah occurred in Michigan v. Jackson.36 In Jackson, the defen-
dant, at his arraignment for murder, was informed of and invoked his
right to appointment of counsel. 87 After the mailing of notice of
appointment of counsel to a law firm, but before its receipt, the police
informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and proceeded to inter-
rogate him. 88 Affirming the Michigan Supreme Court's order over-
turning his convictions, the Supreme Court held that "if police initiate
interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or simi-
lar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's
right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid."8 9
The Court, per Justice Stevens, extended its Fifth Amendment deci-
sion on custodial interrogation in Edwards v. Arizona9 ° to the Sixth
Amendment arena, reasoning that the need to prohibit uncounseled
interrogations after a defendant requested an attorney's assistance was
"even stronger after he ha[d] been formally charged with an offense
than before." 9' Although the Court was careful to state that the right
to counsel did not turn on a request for counsel, the Court saw "no
warrant for a different view" than the one expressed in Edwards, that,
after making a request for counsel, a suspect could not validly waive
her rights by acquiescing in police-initiated interrogation, notwith-
standing her being properly informed of those rights.
9 2
This conflation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to coun-
sel was disputed by Justice Rehnquist's dissent.93 With Justices
85 Id. at 189 (noting that "police misconduct need not be countenanced," not-
withstanding the inapplicability of Massiah to the investigation of separate crimes (cit-
ing United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 1985))).
86 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
87 Id. at 627.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 636.
90 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
91 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631.
92 Id. at 635.
93 The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is "quite distinct" from the Sixth
Amendment right, although the Supreme Court has "blown hot and cold" on this
subject. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 6, § 25.08, at 555. The rights differ in
several ways. For example, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
unless a suspect is in custody, but attaches to custodial interrogation prior to indict-
ment. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment right, unlike its Sixth Amendment coun-
terpart, is not offense-specific. Waiver of the right and application of the exclusionary
rule also differ in the two contexts. See id. at 538-39; see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) ("The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guaran-
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O'Connor and Powell, Justice Rehnquist disputed the very existence
of a Fifth Amendment right to counsel,94 but felt that, in any event,
Edwards' "prophylactic rule," designed to prevent law enforcement
personnel from circumventing a suspect's assertion of his Miranda
rights by hounding the suspect into a waiver of those rights, "ma[de]
no sense at all except when linked to the Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against compelled self-incrimination."9 5 Because there was no
widespread concern over suspects being denied their Sixth Amend-
ment counsel by police, as there had been regarding the Fifth Amend-
ment right, there was no reason to import Edwards into the Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 96 The situation was worsened, in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, by the fact that the importation was artifi-
cially limited to instances in which the defendant requested counsel,
despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not
dependent on such an assertion.
9 7
tee ... is to 'protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his 'expert
adversary' . .. after 'the [ir] adverse positions.., have solidified' . . . . The purpose of
the Miranda-Edwards guarantee, on the other hand ... is to protect a quite different
interest: the suspect's 'desire to deal with the police only through counsel.' This is in
one respect narrower than the interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee
(because it relates only to custodial interrogation) and in another respect broader
(because it relates to interrogation regarding any suspected crime and attaches
whether or not the 'adversarial relationship' produced by a pending prosecution has
yet arisen)." (citations omitted)); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297 (1988) (stat-
ing that "our cases have recognized a 'difference' between the Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, and the 'policies' behind these constitutional
guarantees"); Benjamin F. Diamond, The Sixth Amendment: Narrowing the Scope of the
Right to Counsel, 54 FtA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 n.22 (2002) (contrasting the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel); Uviller, supra note 35, at 1155-56 (noting the
distinction between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as enunciated in Miranda
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel described in Massiah).
94 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 639 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases make
clear that the Fifth Amendment itself provides no such 'right.' . . . Even under
Miranda, the 'right to counsel' exists solely as a means of protecting the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself." (citations
omitted)).
95 Id. at 639-40.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 642 ("The glaring inconsistencies in the Court's opinion arise precisely
because the Court lacks a coherent, analytically sound basis for its decision."). The
"underlying theory of Jackson" was again questioned by the concurrence in Texas v.
Cobb, where Justice Kennedy, with whom Justices Thomas and Scalia joined, noted
that Jackson superseded a defendant's volitional decision to speak to the authorities,
notwithstanding a proper administration of Miranda rights and their waiver. 532 U.S.
162, 174-75 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Given its application even where it
cannot be shown that a defendant did not desire to speak, the rule in Jackson was,
according to Justice Kennedy, of "question [able] . . . wisdom." Id. at 176.
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C. Recent Contraction of the Sixth Amendment
The Court began, for the first time since Massiah, cutting back on
its expansive interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in Patterson v. Illinois.98 Following indictment for a gang-related mur-
der, the defendant had twice confessed his involvement; both confes-
sions followed administration of Miranda warnings and the
defendant's signing a waiver of his rights.99 The Court distinguished
Jackson on the basis that the defendant had not sought to exercise his
right to the presence of an attorney. 100 Justice White's opinion noted
the importance not only of" [p] reserving the integrity of the accused's
choice to communicate with police only through counsel," but also of
"not barring an accused from making an initial election as to whether
he will face the State's officers during questioning with the aid of
counsel, or go it alone."' 0 ' Thus, where one was "made sufficiently
aware of his right to have counsel present . . .and of the possible
consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel"' 0 2-goals
accomplished by the Miranda warnings the defendant had received-
there was a sufficient basis to find that the defendant had made an
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."'1 3 The Court noted that its decision was largely informed
by the limited role for counsel in post-indictment questioning as
opposed to trial proceedings; whereas at trial a defendant's needs are
likely to exceed his abilities, in the pretrial interrogation context the
lawyer's "unidimensional" function is essentially to advise his client
when and when not to answer questions posed.10 4 This "simple and
limited" role for counsel lent itself naturally to a similarly simple and
limited waiver procedure.
10 5
Believing that warnings proffered by the government, no matter
how detailed, could not provide an accused with full understanding of
"the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation," Justice Ste-
vens, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, dis-
sented. 10 6 The only possible justification, in Justice Stevens' eyes, for
post-indictment questioning was to bolster the State's case, not to
98 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
99 Id. at 287-89.
100 Id. at 290-91.
101 Id. at 291.
102 Id. at 292-93.
103 Id. at 292 (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
104 Id. at 294 n.6.
105 Id. at 299.
106 Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
835 (1975)).
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solve a crime, since indictment presumably indicated the State's belief
in its ability to prove its prima facie case; thus, it was unethical for the
state, after solidifying its adversarial position, to advise the accused in
the absence of counsel.1
0 7
McNeil v. Wisconsin'"8 saw the Court establish another important
limitation on the right to counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes,
namely, the right's offense-specific nature. In McNeil, the defendant,
who had been charged with armed robbery, was interrogated by a
detective regarding a murder, attempted murder, and armed burglary
in which the defendant was suspected but for which he had not been
arrested. 10 9 After first denying involvement, the defendant admitted
upon a second questioning that he had participated in the crimes.
Before both interrogations, the defendant had been given his
Miranda warnings and had waived his rights. 10
Justice Scalia's majority had no trouble -determining that the
Sixth Amendment was not violated by this questioning."' The Court
rejected the defendant's attempt to conflate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel, noting that the purpose underlying the
Sixth Amendment right was to protect the unaided layman during
confrontations with the State after formal charges solidified its adver-
sarial position.' 12 To adopt a contrary rule, the Court believed, would
render a suspect accused of one crime inaccessible to law enforce-
ment personnel having reason to suspect him of other crimes, regard-
less of whether he has expressed a disinclination to speak. 113 Notably,
the Court shifted its focus from the accused to the State; "[s]ince the
ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an
unmitigated good," prohibiting police questioning of indicted
defendants for uncharged crimes would make society the loser.
114
Justice Stevens again dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, believing the offense-specificity limitation enunciated by
107 Id. at 306-10.
108 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
109 Id. at 173.
110 Id. at 173-74.
111 Id. at 175 ("The Sixth Amendment fight.., is offense specific. It cannot be
invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is
commenced .... ).
112 Id. at 177-78; see also supra note 93 (discussing the distinction between the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and citing sources, including McNeil).
113 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181.
114 Id. "Admissions of guilt resulting from.. . waivers 'are ... essential to society's
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.'"
Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
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the Court to be a wellspring of confusion.11 5 In favoring the societal
interest in confessions over "the importance of fair procedure," the
Court, according to Justice Stevens, took a view of defense counsel as a
"nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers" rather than "an aid
to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights," and
thus preferred an inquisitorial system of justice over an adversarial
one. 116 Presciently, Justice Stevens hoped that the contours of the
offense-specific restriction would "not be patterned after the Court's
double jeopardy jurisprudence."
1 17
The McNeil Court's increased concern for the State's investigative
abilities and its explicit invocation of offense specificity were revisited
in Cobb, where the Court clarified the meaning of "offense" for Sixth
Amendment purposes. The defendant, free on bail after indictment
in a burglary case, confessed to his father that he had committed mur-
der in the course of the burglary.1 18 The defendant's father contacted
police, who arrested the defendant and, after properly administering
Miranda warnings, obtained a confession to two murders.' 1 9 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, stating that the Court's "decision in McNeil...
meant what it said,"120 defined "offense" with reference to the Court's
double jeopardy decision in Blockburger12 1 Importantly, the Court
stated that it saw "no constitutional difference between the meaning
of the term 'offense' in the contexts of double jeopardy and of the
right to counsel," and so held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached to those offenses that would be the same under the
Blockburger test.122 In rejecting the exception to the offense-specific
limitation for "factually related" offenses that some lower courts had
recognized, the Court distinguished its decisions in Brewer and
Moulton by noting that neither of them squarely addressed the issue at
115 Id. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 188-89 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
117 Id. at 187.
118 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 165 (2001).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 164.
121 Id. at 173 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)); see
also supra note 10 (stating that the Blockburger test views offenses as separate when
each requires proof of an element not required by the other).
122 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173. The Court also noted that it "could just as easily describe
the Sixth Amendment as 'prosecution specific,' insofar as it prevents discussion of
charged offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger, could not be the subject of
a later prosecution," a definition which comported nicely with the Sixth Amend-
ment's coverage of all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 173 n.3.
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hand.123 Responding to the defendant's concerns that Blockburger's
importation would impair the constitutional rights of suspects, the
Chief Justice made two important observations: first, defendants must
still be given Miranda warnings, informing them of their rights against
compulsory self-incrimination and to meet with a lawyer before ques-
tioning;124 and second, "the Constitution does not negate society's
interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects"
whether they have been indicted for other offenses or not.' 25 The
majority also dismissed the dissent's charge that the Blockburger test
would prove unworkable, instead claiming that the dissent's "inextri-
cably intertwined with" proposal was impracticably vague; police, not
yet knowing the precise series of events under their investigation,
could be deterred by the dissent's rule from questioning defendants
at all. 12 6 Thus, as in McNeil, the Court deemed the government's abil-
ity to investigate crimes to be an important factor in its analysis of
whether the Sixth Amendment had been violated.
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and
Ginsburg, criticized the definition of "offense" adopted by the Court
as an "unnecessarily technical" one, "undermin [ing] Sixth Amend-
ment protections while doing nothing to further effective law enforce-
ment."'127  Because of the nature of modern criminal codes,
application of the Blockburger test could permit prosecutors to fashion
a "startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single . . . criminal
transaction." 128 Thus, simply by charging one of these many offenses
and questioning the suspect about the uncharged (but related)
123 Id. at 169 ("Constitutional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions
which did not address the question at issue.").
124 Id. at 171. The Court further noted:
Even though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has not attached to
uncharged offenses, defendants retain the ability under Miranda to refuse
any police questioning, and, indeed, charged defendants presumably have
met with counsel and have had the opportunity to discuss whether it is advis-
able to invoke those Fifth Amendment rights .... [T]here is no "back-
ground principle" of our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence establishing that
there may be no contact between a defendant and police without counsel
present.
Id. at 171-72 n.2.
125 Id. at 171-72.
126 Id. at 173-74.
127 Id. at 179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 182 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970)). Justice
Breyer gave an example whereby a defendant, having robbed a store, could be
charged with "armed robbery, assault, battery, trespass, [and] use of a firearm to com-
mit a felony," all of which could constitute separate offenses under the Blockburger
test. Id.
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crimes, the protection of the Sixth Amendment could be circum-
vented, thereby undermining counsel's role as a channel between her
client and the state. 129 Furthermore, Justice Breyer disputed the easy
applicability of the Blockburger test; although "simple-sounding," the
test had, according to the dissent, "proved extraordinarily difficult to
administer in practice," and would leave law enforcement puzzled as
to when they could or could not question with impunity. 130 Instead,
Justice Breyer advocated the test that had been adopted by various
lower courts, attaching the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
those crimes that were "closely related to" or "inextricably intertwined
with" the charged offense.
1 31
Thus, following Cobb, some features of the Court's Sixth Amend-
ment case law are clear: (1) the right to counsel attaches at the institu-
tion of formal proceedings; (2) following its attachment the
government may not question the defendant outside of counsel's
presence regarding the charged offense without a valid waiver; (3) a
valid waiver may only be made knowingly and voluntarily, and may not
be made at the behest of police for state-initiated interrogation where
the defendant has asserted her right to counsel; (4) waiver may not
occur where the interrogation is surreptitious; (5) analysis of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel involves a balancing of the defendant's
interest in a fair trial with society's interest in apprehending criminals;
and (6) the right is offense-specific, and in this context the definition
of "offense" is that enunciated in Blockburger.
132
However, the Court in Cobb did not address one aspect of its
introduction of Blockburger into the Sixth Amendment sphere: did the
Court intend to import its double jeopardy jurisprudence wholesale
into the Sixth Amendment context, or did it intend to confine this
intertwining strictly to Blockburgers "offense" definition? More specifi-
cally, did the Court intend the dual sovereignty doctrine featured in
its double jeopardy cases to become a feature of the Sixth Amend-
ment as well? It is this issue that has divided the lower courts.
129 Id. at 182-83. The dissent further disputed the majority's distinguishing of
Brewer and Moulton, claiming that those cases would have been decided differently
under the Blockburger test. See id. at 183-84. However, Justice Breyer also admitted
that the Court had not previously decided the issue. Id. at 184.
130 Id. at 185.
131 Id. at 186-87. This test was, in the dissent's view, "far easier to apply" than the
Blockburger test, and better advanced the Sixth Amendment right to counsel's fairness
concerns. Id. at 187.
132 For a clear, concise overview of the Court's Sixth Amendment cases and their
relation to one another, see 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 6, §§ 25.01 to .06, at
525-50.
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II. THE DuAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
The dual sovereignty doctrine states, in essence, that violations of
the laws of separate sovereigns are, by definition, separate offenses;
practically speaking, the same conduct may transgress the laws of mul-
tiple sovereigns. 133 In the double jeopardy context 1 34 where it is most
often seen,1 35 this doctrine dictates that successive prosecutions by dif-
ferent sovereigns (i.e., federal and state governments) are permissible,
because the prosecutions are for different offenses.
A. History and Modern Development
The origins of the dual sovereignty doctrine may be traced to the
early nineteenth century and the Supreme Court's decision in Hous-
ton v. Moore,136 where the Court upheld against constitutional attack a
Pennsylvania law which incorporated by reference federal penalties
against militiamen failing to report for federal duty. 13 7 Although the
majority's opinion seemed not to recognize a dual sovereignty doc-
trine, 138 Justice Johnson's concurrence noted that, as each citizen
enjoys the protections of and owes allegiance to both the national and
state governments, there was in principle no reason why a single crimi-
nal act could not be punished by both the state and federal
governments. 13
9
133 See, e.g., David Bryan Owsley, Note, Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to
Double Jeopardy: A Hard Case Study, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 765, 766-67 (2003); see also Heath
v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) ("The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the
common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the govern-
ment."); Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290 (1992) ("The dual sovereignty doctrine
derives from the common law notion that a crime is an offense against the
sovereign.").
134 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ").
135 The dual sovereignty doctrine has been applied in other contexts at various
times in the nation's history. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar &Jonathan L. Marcus, Double
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1995) (discussing the
doctrine's application, and subsequent abandonment, in the Fourth Amendment
unreasonable search and seizure context and the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
context).
136 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
137 Id. at 24-31.
138 The precise scope of the majority's holding is unclear, and in any event was
limited essentially to its facts by Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 130 (1959). See Braun,
supra note 12, at 17-18; Owsley, supra note 133, at 771 n.37.
139 Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 33 (Johnson,J., concurring) ("Why may not the
same offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States, and of the
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The Court began to assert the dual sovereignty rationale more
firmly, if not explicitly, in Fox v. Ohio,140 where it upheld an Ohio
anticounterfeiting statute as constitutional against a double jeopardy
attack.1 41 The Court rested its decision on the fact that the Bill of
Rights did not apply to state governments.1 42 But the Court also dis-
played comfort with the notion of successive prosecutions, noting that
any problems accompanying the notion of duplicative actions would
be softened by the discretion of law enforcement. 143 Dissenting, Jus-
tice McLean stated that the possibility of redundant prosecutions by
the federal and state governments was "a great defect in our system"
and offensive to "common principles of humanity," but conceded that
the double jeopardy prohibition applied to "the respective
governments.
'144
These arguments were reprised in Moore v. Illinois.145 Once more
the Court was undisturbed by the prospect of concurrent federal and
state jurisdiction and multiple prosecutions thereunder, given the
dual allegiances of the federal system under which the citizenry had
chosen to operate, 146 and once more Justice McLean dissented on the
United States? Every citizen of a State owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protec-
tion and participates in the government of both the State and the United States.").
140 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
141 Id. at 434-35.
142 Id. (citing Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
143 Id. at 435. The Court went on to note:
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions
both of the State and federal systems are administered, an offender who
should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be sub-
jected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the
same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or
where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor. But were a contrary
course of policy and action either probable or usual, this would by no means
justify the conclusion, that offences falling within the competency of differ-
ent authorities to restrain or punish them would not properly be subjected
to the consequences which those authorities might ordain and affix to their
perpetration.
Id.
144 Id. at 439 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice McLean, who would have invali-
dated the state law under the Supremacy Clause, stated that the spirit, if not the letter,
of double jeopardy "applies with equal force against a double punishment, for the
same act, by a State and the federal government." Id.
145 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
146 The Court made its position eminently clear:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punish-
ment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence
or transgression of the laws of both. ... That either or both may (if they see
2007] 2115
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
grounds that preemption should apply and that concurrent jurisdic-
tion and successive prosecutions were "contrary to the nature and
genius of our government."'
' 47
The Court definitively endorsed the dual sovereignty doctrine in
United States v. Lanza.148 Citing both Fox and Moore for the proposi-
tion that dual sovereignty was "supported by a long line of decisions,"
a unanimous Court held that federal prosecution under the Eight-
eenth Amendment was permissible despite the defendant's conviction
at the state level for violations of Washington's prohibition laws.
149
Chief Justice Taft openly based the Court's decision upon the dual
sovereignty doctrine, stating that
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its
peace and dignity is exercising its own 'sovereignty, not that of the
other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national
and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of
both and may be punished by each.1 50
And to make clear that this was not a fleeting, fact-specific decision,
the Court explicitly noted that the State's authority to legislate was not
based upon any provision of the Eighteenth Amendment, but rather
was a function of the power reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment.151
The Court revisited, and reaffirmed, the dual sovereignty doc-
trine in a pair of 1959 decisions: Bartkus v. Illinoisl 52 and Abbate v.
United States.153 In Bartkus, the Court considered a state conviction
that was preceded by a federal acquittal.1 54 Justice Frankfurter's
majority found this issue was "not a new question," having been
"invoked and rejected in over twenty cases," and "not [having] been
questioned by th[e] Court since the opinion in Fox."155 The Court
fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but
only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is
'justly punishable.
Id. at 20.
147 Id. at 21 (McLean, J., dissenting).
148 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
149 Id. at 382.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 381-82; see also Dawson, supra note 133, at 292-93 ("[T]he Tenth
Amendment is the source for the dual sovereignty doctrine ...
152 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
153 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
154 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121-22.
155 Id. at 128-29.
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surveyed its prior precedents dating back to Houston through Lanza
and beyond, as well as the decisions of both lower federal and state
courts, 1 5 6 and determined that "disregard of a long, unbroken,
unquestioned course of impressive adjudication" was not merely
unwarranted, but "would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of
the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and
order within their confines." 157 Although the Court recognized it had
"little sympathy" for the doctrine-given that the States were more
competent to deal with the intricacies of criminal codes and proper
prosecution thereunder-it was not the Court's place to interfere,
especially where the doctrine was an incident of the federal system
designed by the Founders.
158
Justice Black's dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas joined, found successive prosecutions to be
abhorrent from the standpoint of the individual thus prosecuted, not-
withstanding the sovereignty of the prosecutors. 159 It was no answer
to invoke "federalism" as a talisman to permit the loss of rights
through "the combined operations of the two governments."1 60 The
"dangerous fiction" of dual sovereignty was also unnecessary in Justice
Black's view, since Congress could merely preempt the states in mat-
ters under its power, while in purely local matters the states should
have final authority. 161
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, also joined by
Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren, found that the "extent of
participation of the federal authorities" should have barred the state
trial.1 62 While recognizing that "cooperation between federal and
state authorities in criminal law enforcement is to be desired and
encouraged," Justice Brennan believed that the price of such coopera-
tive federalism was the requirement of "present[ing] the strongest
case . . .at a single trial."
163
156 Id. at 128-37.
157 Id. at 136-37 ("It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the
reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution ... by federal
authorities beyond the control of the States.").
158 Id. at 137-39.
159 Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 156. Justice Black was of the opinion that the Court should "be suspi-
cious of any supposed 'requirements' of 'federalism' which result in obliterating
ancient safeguards." Id. at 155.
161 Id. at 157.
162 Id. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 168-69. As Justice Brennan noted, this "sham" exception was "appar-
ently acknowledge[d]" by the Court. Id. at 167. The Court, however, did not apply
such an exception, instead finding:
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The Court in Abbate, considering a state conviction followed by a
federal prosecution, referred to many of the same concerns as it had
in Bartkus, again citing substantial case law for the proposition that
"the same act might... constitute an offense against both the State
and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the pen-
alties denounced by either."'164 Justice Brennan, this time writing for
the majority, quoted extensively from Moore and Lanza and expressly
declined to overrule the latter given the "undesirable consequences
[that] would follow." 16 5 In so holding, the Court pointed out the diffi-
culties involved in abandoning the dual sovereignty doctrine: if state
prosecutions barred federal prosecutions based upon the same
actions, this would necessarily hamstring federal law enforcement per-
sonnel; conversely, if federal prosecutions barred state prosecutions,
the distribution of crime-fighting power would be impermissibly
shifted, given that "the States under our federal system have the prin-
cipal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes."'166 As in
Bartkus, Justice Black dissented with Justice Douglas and Chief Justice
Warren, voicing essentially the same concerns he had previously and
adding that he was "not convinced that a State and the Nation can be
considered two wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of




In the twentieth century, the Court retreated from its decision in
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,168 in which it had held the Bill of Rights
inapplicable as a limitation on the states' power,169 and began, bit by
bit, to incorporate the various rights enshrined in the Constitution's
[The record] does not support the claim that the State of Illinois ... was
merely a tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment .... It does not sustain a conclusion that the state
prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in
essential fact another federal prosecution.
Id. at 123-24 (majority opinion).
164 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 191 (quoting United States v. Marigold,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569 (1850)). Indeed, in addition to discussions of Houston v.
Moore, Fox, Moore v. Illinois, and Lanza, the Court's string citations reference no less
than eighteen more of its own cases adhering to the dual sovereignty principle. Id. at
190-94.
165 Id. at 195.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
168 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
169 Id. at 249.
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inaugural amendments against the states. 170 The Court incorporated
protection against double jeopardy in Benton v. Maryland.I 71 Despite
this incorporation, and although the Court abandoned dual sover-
eignty concepts in the self-incrimination 72 and unreasonable search
and seizure1 73 contexts following their incorporation, the Court
rejected the invitation to abandon dual sovereignty in the double
jeopardy context in Heath v. Alabama.
174
Heath involved the unusual situation of successive state prosecu-
tions, a situation which the Court had not before considered; notwith-
standing this new factual wrinkle, Justice O'Connor's seven-Justice
majority unflinchingly upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine. 175 The
Court stated that the crucial issue in application of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine is "whether the two entities that seek successive[ ] ...
prosecut[ions] ... draw their authority to punish the offender from
distinct sources of power," and reiterated Lanza's notion that the
states' powers to prosecute criminal violations derive from the Tenth
Amendment's preservation of state power that preexisted the
Union.176 The Court also rejected the notion that the doctrine is
"simply a fiction," pointing to its "weighty support in the historical
understanding and political realities of the States' role in the federal
system." I77 Given these interests, a state could not be denied its inher-
ent power to prosecute crimes simply because another sovereign had
"won the race to the courthouse."1 7 8
Notably, Heath's dissenters, Justices Marshall and Brennan, dis-
agreed only with the dual sovereignty doctrine's extension to the con-
text of successive state prosecutions. 179 Justice Marshall discussed at
170 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (Fifth Amendment self-incrimi-
nation clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (Fourth Amendment
unreasonable search and seizure).
171 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
172 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).
173 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
174 474 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1985).
175 Id. at 89.
176 Id. at 88-89.
177 Id. at 92.
178 Id. at 93. The Court made clear that it was not sufficient that one prosecuting
sovereign's interests aligned with the other's. Such a balancing approach, while "diffi-
cult and uncertain," would also be entirely inadequate: "A State's interest in vindicat-
ing its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be
satisfied by another State's enforcement of its own laws." Id. at 92-93.
179 Id. at 100-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where two States seek to prosecute
the same defendant for the same crime in two separate proceedings, the justifications
found in the federal-state context for an exemption from double jeopardy constraints
simply do not hold.").
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length, and with approval, the doctrine's application where the fed-
eral government and a state are involved, echoing the federalism con-
cerns and prevention of hindrances to law enforcement that the
Court had noted in Abbate.
180
The foregoing demonstrates the development of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine and its underlying rationales: (1) a sovereign's ability
to protect the welfare of its citizenry through the definition and
enforcement of criminal laws is a core component of the states' tradi-
tional powers, preserved thereto by the Tenth Amendment, as well as
of the federal government's expansive powers; (2) conduct is made no
less criminal by virtue of its violation of the criminal codes of more
than one of these sovereign entities; and (3) to prohibit the enforce-
ment of one of these sovereigns' laws because another of them won
the race to the courthouse would ill serve the interests of either sover-
eign or the publics they protect. In short, as Justice Marshall stated,
the possibility of multiple prosecutions is "the price of living in a fed-
eral system, the cost of dual citizenship. 181
However, the Court has never addressed the implementation of
the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Sixth Amendment right-to-coun-
sel context, and few have considered the ramifications of such an
extension. Indeed, the Court in Cobb left the lower courts to sort the
question out for themselves. Although the circuits have not been in
accord, I shall demonstrate in the following Part that the adoption of
the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Sixth Amendment context not
only follows inevitably from the Court's opinion in Cobb, but is also the
correct choice, properly balancing the disparate interests of the defen-
dant and the state.
III. INTEGRATING DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SixTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Since the Court handed down its decision in Cobb, the issue of
whether the dual sovereignty doctrine was imported into the Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence has split those circuits
considering it nearly evenly. On the one hand, the First, Fifth, and
(most recently) Fourth Circuits have held that Cobb did incorporate
the doctrine into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, based on a
plain reading of the opinion and the sovereignty concerns impli-
180 Id. at 99. Although Justice Marshall did not find any specific intent on the part
of the Founders to implement a dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy, he
stated that this risk of successive prosecutions was "the cost of dual citizenship." Id. at
98-99.
181 Id. at 99.
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cated. 182 On the other hand, the Second and Eighth Circuits, joined
in dicta by the Seventh Circuit, have read Cobb to the contrary, finding
the risk of collusion too high to hold otherwise. 183 Below I discuss
their arguments, as well as other concerns implicated by the marriage
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and dual sovereignty, and
explain why such a marriage is the appropriate reading of Cobb.
The easiest and most straightforward reason for interpreting Cobb
to have adopted the dual sovereignty doctrine is the decision's plain
language. In importing the Blockburger test to define "offense" for
Sixth Amendment ight-to-counsel purposes, the Court clearly stated
that it saw "no constitutional difference between the meaning of the
term 'offense' in the contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to
counsel." 184 This statement seems quite plainly to mean that,
whatever "offense" might mean in the double jeopardy context, the
same meaning obtains in the Sixth Amendment context. 185 As dis-
cussed previously, the Court has long held that an "offense" against
the laws of one sovereign is not, under double jeopardy, an offense
against the laws of another.' 86 A clear-cut reading of Cobb would simi-
larly lead directly to the conclusion that violations of the criminal laws
of a state and of the federal government are separate "offenses" when
considering attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Indeed, this has been the cornerstone of the decisions adopting the
dual sovereignty doctrine under Cobb,187 and has even been conceded
182 See United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 81 (2006); United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2005); United
States v. Avants, 278 F.3d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 2002).
183 See United States v. Krueger, 415 F.3d 766, 777 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mills, 412 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 715 (8th
Cir. 2002).
184 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001).
185 Indeed, one might say that Cobb, like McNeil before it, "meant what it said." Id.
at 165.
186 See supra Part II.
187 The Fifth Circuit had the following to say on the matter:
Particularly relevant to our analysis today, the Court [in Cobb] saw "no consti-
tutional difference between the meaning of the term 'offense' in the con-
texts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel."
Thus, it seems rather clear that the Supreme Court would require us to
apply double jeopardy principles in determining whether two offenses are
the same in the Sixth Amendment context.... By concluding without limi-
tation that the term "offense" has the same meaning under the Sixth
Amendment as it does under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court effec-
tively foreclosed any argument that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not
inform the definition of "offense" under the Sixth Amendment.
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as the most natural interpretation of Cobb by its critics. 8 8 It would
follow, one supposes, that the lower courts should not depart from
such an open and obvious statement of the Supreme Court, but
should leave its reevaluation to that high body.18 9
Of course, such a literal, formalistic reading of the Court's lan-
guage is not entirely satisfying, for it does not address the larger ques-
tion of whether the right to counsel and dual sovereignty are
compatible. The Courts of Appeals considering and rejecting the the-
ory that Cobb adopted dual sovereignty in the Sixth Amendment con-
text have expressed concern that this strict interpretation would open
a loophole in the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence
that would effectively gut it, permitting collusion by sovereigns. 190
This echoes the doubts voiced by Justice Breyer in his Cobb dissent' 9 1
as well as in academic criticism of the decision. 192 This criticism, how-
Avants, 278 F.3d at 517 (citations omitted); see also Alvarado, 440 F.3d at 196
("Because Cobb clearly indicates that the definition of offense is the same in the right
to counsel and double jeopardy contexts, the dual sovereignty doctrine has equal
application in both. Indeed, if dual sovereignty is a central feature of double jeop-
ardy analysis, it cannot help but be a central feature of offense-specificity analysis
since the two after Cobb are constitutionally one and the same." (citation omitted));
Coker, 433 F.3d at 44 ("If the Court intended to incorporate only the Blockburger test
into its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, then its statement in Cobb would make no
sense, as there would be a difference in the meaning of the term 'offense' in the
contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel.").
188 See Krueger, 415 F.3d at 776 ("Because the Supreme Court has held that term
[sic] 'offense' has the same meaning for purposes of the... Sixth Amendment analy-
sis as it does for double jeopardy purposes, one might conclude that a defendant's
invocation of his right to counsel as to a charge brought by a state government will
not be treated as the invocation of his right as to the federal charge . . . ." (citation
omitted)); DavidJ. D'Addio, Comment, Dual Sovereignty and the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel, 113 YALE L.J. 1991, 1993 (2004) (admitting that "[i]f there is truly 'no
difference' between the meanings of offense in the double jeopardy and right-to-
counsel contexts, then it follows that dual sovereignty ... should be part of the right-
to-counsel definition of offense as well").
189 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (stating that Courts of Appeals should "leav[e] to th[e] Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions").
190 See United States v. Mills, 412 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (fearing that "a dual
sovereignty exception would permit one sovereign to question a defendant whose
right to counsel had attached, to do so in the absence of counsel and then to share
the information with the other sovereign without fear of suppression"); see also Krue-
ger, 415 F.3d at 777 (quoting the Second Circuit's opinion in Mills).
191 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., D'Addio, supra note 188, at 1998 (opining that dual sovereignty would
permit the noncharging sovereign to question the defendant outside of counsel's
presence, and then hand off the information to the charging sovereign were the
charging sovereign in a "be[tter] position to make use of the incriminating evi-
[VOL. 82: 52122
THE COST OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP
ever, falls short upon closer inspection. First, it fails to recognize the
Cobb Court's admonition that a suspect must still be given her Miranda
warnings, which inform her of her right against compulsory self-
incrimination as well as her right to consult with a lawyer before being
subjected to custodial interrogation. 9 3 Thus, just as a defendant who
does not wish to speak to the charging sovereign's investigators except
through counsel will have been informed of her right to do so, so will
that defendant have been apprised of her right to do the same with
respect to questioning at the hands of another sovereign.
The concern about collusion also ignores the Bartkus Court's
apparent recognition of a "sham" exception to the dual sovereignty
doctrine. As Justice Brennan noted in his Bartkus dissent, the Court
"apparently acknowledge [d]" an exception to the traditional rule of
dual sovereignty: where one body is "merely a tool" of the other or
brings its prosecution as "a sham and a cover" for the other, the dual
sovereignty doctrine will not apply.194 This exception, designed to
guard against the precise concerns regarding circumvention and col-
lusion addressed by Justice Breyer and others, is no less applicable to
dual sovereignty's employment in the context of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. 195 Indeed, in today's world of widespread
dence"); Andrew Hanawalt, Note, Investigation of Represented Defendants After Texas v.
Cobb, 81 TEX. L. REv. 895, 913-14 (2003) (applauding the recognition of offense
specificity as a means of promoting society's interest in investigation, but criticizing
Cobb for permitting investigation of uncovered criminal transactions as tipping the
scale too far against defendants); Melissa Minas, Note, Blurring the Line: Impact of
Offense-Specific Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 93 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195,
222-24 (2002) (criticizing the Cobb majority for failing to consider the decision's
potential for circumvention of the Sixth Amendment).
193 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 & n.2 (2001) ("Even though the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has not attached to uncharged offenses, defendants
retain the ability under Miranda to refuse any police questioning, and, indeed,
charged defendants presumably have met with counsel and have had the opportunity
to discuss whether it is advisable to invoke those Fifth Amendment rights."); cf Patter-
son v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293-94 (1988) (noting the ameliorative effects of
Miranda warnings even where the defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel).
194 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 167 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
123-24 (majority opinion); see also Dawson, supra note 133, at 296 (recognizing that
Bartkus suggested a sham exception, and criticizing its overly narrow application);
Owsley, supra note 133, at 774-75 (noting that "[t]he Bartkus Court suggested an
exception to the dual sovereign doctrine" for an "orchestrated ... bypass" of double
jeopardy).
195 See United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing a Bart-
kus exception to dual sovereignty "where 'one sovereign so thoroughly dominates or
manipulates the prosecutorial machinery of another that the latter retains little or no
volition in its own proceedings,"' and finding it to "appl[y] with equal force in the
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cooperative law enforcement, this exception must form an important
part of the application of any dual sovereignty doctrine.
1 96
The Bartkus sham exception can also explain another criticism of
dual sovereignty more generally, namely, its survival of the Bill of
Rights' incorporation against the states. As noted earlier, the Court
abandoned analogues of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the contexts
of self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure following
the application of these rights to the states. 197 The apparent rationale
for discarding the doctrine in these circumstances appears to have
been that evidence illegally obtained by one sovereign undergoes no
ablution by being handed to another sovereign.' 98 However, while
this "silver platter doctrine" by definition involved collusion between
state and federal officers, no collusion inheres in the dual sovereignty
doctrine. 99 While collusion must no doubt be guarded against, the
government's "legitimate interest in enforcing its own laws" must also
be recognized. 200 The Bartkus exception, excluding information
obtained in a complicit attempt to circumvent the Sixth Amendment's
protections, provides a balanced response to fears of collusion while
still permitting each sovereign to effectuate "society's interest in the
ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects," 20 1 which is an
"unmitigated good."20 2
Sixth Amendment context" (quoting United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (lst
Cir. 1996))); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting Chief Justice Bur-
ger's assertion that exclusion in cases where officials acted in bad faith in their inter-
rogation or choice of indictments was the proper course, rather than a blanket rule
against all questioning even for uncharged offenses).
196 See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168-69 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (encouraging coopera-
tion between state and federal authorities, but criticizing the use of such cooperation
to "harass the accused"); Owsley, supra note 133, at 789-90 (accepting a sham excep-
tion under Bartkus, but noting that the evidentiary burden must necessarily be high,
so as not to inhibit intergovernmental cooperation or insertjudicial scrutiny too detri-
mentally into law enforcement); cf. Braun, supra note 12, at 65-72 (discussing the
broad range of "cooperative federalism" and the potential for "collusive federalism"
under dual sovereignty); Dawson, supra note 133, at 296-97 (noting the extent of
state-federal cooperation in criminal law enforcement, and criticizing the infrequent
use of the sham exception as "illusory").
197 See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960).
199 See Dawson, supra note 133, at 295-96 (noting the distinction between the
necessity of cooperation under the "silver platter doctrine," as opposed to successive
prosecutions, and citing Bartkus as recognizing a potential exception explaining dual
sovereignty's persistence).
200 Owsley, supra note 133, at 789.
201 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001).
202 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991).
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Perhaps the most important reason for interpreting Cobb to have
brought the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the auspices of
the dual sovereignty doctrine is the respect for federalism principles
embodied by that doctrine, principles to which the Court has lately
given heed. Dual sovereignty is founded on federalism concerns.203
Those concerns are nowhere more noticeable than in the context of
criminal law, which has always been an area of primarily state con-
trol.20 4 This framework of divided authority is not accidental; it is a
purposeful construct designed by the Framers to preserve basic liber-
ties.205 As the Court has noted, the Tenth Amendment reserves to the
states a measure of sovereignty, indeed, it reserves to them all that
sovereignty which was not relinquished to the federal government
under the Constitution. 20 6 From the Tenth Amendment, the dual
sovereignty doctrine naturally springs.
20 7
The Tenth Amendment federalism foundation of the doctrine is
crucial to understanding that dual sovereignty is not just a "fiction"
that permits one to more easily conceptualize the federal system of
government; it plays a vital role in protecting a fundamental area of
state concern. The recent expansion of federal criminal law has
drawn the attention of both the Court and academia. 20 8 Among the
203 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) ("The Court's express ratio-
nale for the dual sovereignty doctrine . . .finds weighty support in the historical
understanding and political realities of the States' role in the federal system .... ); see
also id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling dual sovereignty "the price of living in a
federal system").
204 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("Under our federal
system, 'the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law.'" (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993))); see also Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91,109 (1945) (plurality opinion) ("Under our federal system
the administration of criminal justice rests with the States ....").
205 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36 (2003).
206 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (finding it to be
"incontestible that the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty,"' which
was made express by the Tenth Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution . . . 'leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty' reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment."
(citation omitted)).
207 See supra notes 151, 176 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561 n.3. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of
American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995) (arguing that the expansion of
federal criminal law is irreconcilable with principles of federalism); Garnett, supra
note 205 (expressing concern that the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction
through use of the spending power may be inconsistent with the Constitution's struc-
ture and purpose); Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the
2007] 2125
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
major incidents of this expansion have been increased cooperation
between federal and state governments in criminal investigations, a
part of the phenomenon known as "cooperative federalism," as well as
increasingly overlapping jurisdiction between the two governments as
federal crimes proliferate.2
0 9
Given the growth of federal criminal law enforcement, it is essen-
tial to consider the enormity of a constitutional bar to interrogation
by one sovereign where the other has had the good fortune of first
apprehending a suspect, and such a bar's implications for criminal
investigation and the interests of both federal and state governments.
On the one hand, if the federal government could preclude state gov-
ernments from investigating a crime based on having charged a defen-
dant therewith, the federal government would effectively be
preempting state law by defining the crime for the state.210 This
would no doubt be a "shocking and untoward deprivation" of the
states' rights to define and punish crimes occurring within their bor-
ders,21' and would violate the very fundamentals of federalism. 212
Conversely, if a state's charging of a defendant could block federal
investigators from interrogating her, the result would be a veto power
in the state, a result just as troubling as federal preemption. 213 Quite
naturally, one sovereign cannot be counted on to protect the interests
of another in its investigation and enforcement of its criminal laws, for
Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996) (arguing that broad fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction is consistent with the original understanding of federalism).
209 See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 794-807 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the consequences of jurisdictional
overlap); cf. Braun, supra note 12, at 7-9 (criticizing dual sovereignty in the age of
cooperative federalism). Indeed, the Court in its concern with the metastasizing of
federal power, has recently attempted to place some limits on federal criminal law,
albeit minor ones. See Garnett, supra note 205, at 36 ("[T]he creeping federalization
of crime can, if left unchecked, threaten the 'sensitive relation between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction.'" (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3)).
210 See Owsley, supra note 133, at 783. The Court long ago rejected the preemp-
tion argument in the dual sovereignty context. See supra notes 140-47 and accompa-
nying text.
211 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121, 137 (1959)).
212 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the
federal government may not commandeer state officers to enforce a federal regula-
tory program, as such commandeering is "fundamentally incompatible with our con-
stitutional system of dual sovereignty"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (holding that "States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States"
and that the federal government "may not compel the States to enact or administer"
federal regulatory programs).
213 See Amar & Marcus, supra note 135, at 17; Owsley, supra note 133, at 783-84.
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different sovereigns serve different constituencies with differing views
as to the proper level of criminalization of activities. 214 This is no less
true in the area of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel than in the
double jeopardy context, for, as the Court has noted, "the Constitu-
tion does not negate society's interest in the ability of police to [inves-
tigate crimes]., 215 Indeed, if the dual sovereignty doctrine's vitality in
the double jeopardy context is based upon a vindication of the inter-
ests of each sovereign in effective enforcement of its criminal laws, its
retention in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nat-
urally follows, for enforcement can hardly be effective if investigation
is precluded. And as noted before, the Bartkus sham exception pre-
vents this otherwise slippery slope from being carried too far and pro-
viding an end run by which to impinge upon the defendant's interest
in a fair trial. 216
Nor is this concern for federalism inconsistent with the underly-
ing rationale of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that of "fair
administration of our adversary system of criminal justice."217 While
the constitutional underpinnings of the Massiah line of cases may not
be the most sturdy,218 they have consistently recognized that the
defendant's interest in a fair trial must be balanced against the gov-
ernment's interest in combating crime.219 In short, to permit either
214 See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 ("A State's interest in vindicating its sovereign author-
ity through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another
State's enforcement of its own laws."); Owsley, supra note 133, at 785-87 (discussing a
variety of ways in which national and local interests might diverge, including disparate
penalties, differing values regarding controversial subjects, and various underlying
theories of criminal punishment, and noting the difficulty in asking the judiciary to
determine whether these various interests align sufficiently to permit one sovereign's
activities to erect a bar to the other's enforcement action).
215 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2001); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 181 (1991) ("Admissions of guilt . . . 'are essential to society's compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."' (quoting
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986))); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
179-80 (1985) ("The police have an interest in the thorough investigation of crimes
for which formal charges have already been filed. They also have an interest in inves-
tigating new or additional crimes.... [T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges as
to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the
evidence was obtained .. .would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the
investigation of criminal activities.").
216 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
217 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); see also Gardner, supra note 40, at
399-403 (citing fairness as the primary value protected by the Court's Massiah line of
cases).
218 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181 (noting that "the ready ability to obtain
uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good," and thus "society
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sovereign to bar the other from questioning defendants regarding
crimes for which the former has filed charges would allow the charg-
ing sovereign effectively to define the crime for the other, frustrating
the federal system envisioned by the Framers and society's interest in
crime prevention. The interest of a defendant in a fair trial, while no
doubt of grave importance, is adequately protected by a carefully fash-
ioned "sham" exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine and the
Miranda warnings that she must in any event receive. To further
extend this "fairness" rationale would be to impermissibly disrupt the
federal system and ignore "the price of living in a federal system, the
cost of dual citizenship. "220
CO:4CLUSION
The Sixth Amendment provides a vital check on governmental
power, permitting a defendant charged with a crime to rely upon her
attorney as a medium through which to approach the vast acumen
and resources of her sovereign adversary. Naturally, any circumscrip-
tion of the defendant's protections must be carefully considered
before adoption. Butjust as important as the defendant's interest in a
fair trial is the interest of society in effective enforcement of its crimi-
nal laws and "maintain [ing] peace and order within [its] confines."22
1
The Supreme Court clearly recognized these competing interests in
Cobb and chose to import, without limitation, the Blockburger defini-
tion of "offense" in the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel context. In
equating the definition of "offense" in these two contexts, the Court
implicitly acknowledged the viability of the dual sovereignty doctrine
in both. The doctrine thus protects both the federalism interests
inherent in a system of concurrent criminal jurisdiction and-when
properly understood as including both an exception for collusion and
as remaining subject to the protections of Miranda warnings-the
defendant's interests in a fair adversarial proceeding and the con-
would be a loser" in adopting a rule under which charged defendants were exempted
from questioning); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179 (recognizing the necessity of police inves-
tigation of crimes for which charges have been brought, as well as additional crimes);
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406 ("The crime of which [the defendant] was convicted ...
call [ed] for swift and energetic action by the police to apprehend the perpetrator and
gather evidence with which he could be convicted. No mission of law enforcement
officials is more important."); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) ("We
do not question that.., in many cases, it [is] entirely proper to continue an investiga-
tion of suspected criminal activities of the defendant ... even though the defendant
ha[s] already been indicted.").
220 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 99 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
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comitant protections afforded by the "Assistance of Counsel.
222
While the risks of collusion are undoubtedly greater as federalization
of crime continues, so are the risks of "a shocking and untoward dep-
rivation" of the states' "historic right and obligation" to enforce their
criminal laws.2 23 This is the "price of living in [the] federal system
224
which our Founders deemed necessary "'to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties.' "225 And these risks are appropriately balanced
by adoption of a properly defined dual sovereignty doctrine in the
context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
222 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
223 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137.
224 Heath, 474 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
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